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COAL MINING A PUBLIC UTILITY-A DIFFERENT
VIEW
By PAGE M. BRERETON, of the Denver Bar
T HE writer has read with interest the article "Coal Min-
ing a Public Utility," presented in October DICTA.
The disorganization of the industry described is real and
a remedy is, no doubt, sorely needed. The writer, however,
doubts the practicability of the remedy suggested. In the first
place it is submitted that the language quoted from Chapter
46 of the Compiled Laws of 1921:
"* * * and every corporation, or person now or hereafter
declared by law to be affected with a public interest, and each thereof,
is hereby declared to be a public utility and to be subject to the jurisdic-
tion, control and regulation of the Commission and to the provisions of
this Act."
contemplates not a judicial but a legislative declaration that
the business is affected with a public interest, which at present
is lacking.
Even if the legislature should pass an act declaring the
business of coal mining to be affected with a public interest or
by such an act attempt to place the business directly under the
jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission, the constitutionality
of such an act might well be doubted in view of Dorchy vs.
Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 68 L. Ed. 686, decided subsequent to
"People vs. United Mine Workers" and in which it is held
that the business of coal mining is not affected with a public
interest and that any attempted regulation analogous to that
proposed is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution and therefore void. See also Charles
Wolff Packing Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
262 U. S. 522, 67 L. Ed. 1103.
"People vs. United Mine Workers of America" was cited
in the Dorchy case but its reasoning evidently was not ap-
proved. Indeed, while the case has not been overruled ex-
pressly, some doubt is cast upon the soundness of the decision
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as a judicial precedent in People vs. Aladdin Theater, 96 Colo.
527, 530.
Indeed, it is to be questioned whether the gains that the
industry is alleged to have made under the code were not more
illusory than real if the entire industry be considered. The
principal activity of the "Code Authority," at least in the
northern Colorado coal field, revolved around an attempt to
enforce a regulation adopted by that authority providing that
all mines in the area charge a "differential," to-wit, an in-
creased price on all coal that moved from the mines by truck
or wagon over that charged for coal that moved from the
mines by rail. This differential was first fixed at 75c per ton;
more than the railroad freight from any mine in the district to
Denver. My recollection is that it was afterward reduced to
50c per ton.
This regulation, unique in the history of merchandising,
so far as the writer knows, while it was enforced bore heavily
upon the mines which had no railroad facilities or which had
theretofore catered to the trucking trade, and may have stifled
a few small enterprises. Tonnage was diverted from such to
the larger minijg units which had railroad facilities, thus giv-
ing them a temporary prosperity. Those benefited have been
vocal in praise of the regulation. Those injured have not
been able to make themselves heard over the Hallelujah
chorus. Whether the industry as a whole has benefited is
questionable.
It is suggested that if the coal mining industry were
under jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission, that body
could prevent the opening of new mines by refusing "Certifi-
cates of Public Convenience or Necessity." Undoubtedly the
opening of new mines when there are sufficient mines now in
operation to supply the demand is a disorganizing element in
the industry. On the other hand, for the state to tax the own-
ers of undeveloped coal lands on their coal values, as is the
practice, and at the same time forbid the owner to sell or use
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the coal (in many cases the only value which the land has)
would be a gross injustice and amount to confiscation.
Again, it is hardly consonant with justice to say to A,
"You are forbidden to mine your land so that your neighbor
B can mine his coal at a profit."
A man is ordinarily entitled to use his land for any use
to which it may be adapted so long as he does not create a
nuisance and on this point the words of Chief Justice Hughes
in a case involving attempts to enforce the "proration" law of
the State of Texas are at least significant:
"The existence and nature of the complainants' rights are not
open to question. Their ownership of the oil properties is undisputed.
Their right to the enjoyment and use of these properties subject to
reasonable regulations by the state in the exercise of its power to pre-
vent unnecessary loss, destruction and waste, is protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Sterling vs. Coanstantin,
287 U. S. 378, 77 L. Ed. 375.
To the writer it does not seem possible either to make
existing coal mines subject to regulation as public utilities, or
to shut off the opening of new mines without invading rights
of the owners guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
The Guffey bill has now been enacted into law. Its
constitutionality may well be doubted. Its purpose is clearly
regulations by the Federal Government of intrastate business
and the writer doubts whether this can be effected by changing
the emphasis from the "interstate commerce clause" to the
"taxing power."
If the Guffey act is to accomplish its purpose, one thing
is immediately apparent. The members of the industry must
treat each other fairly. What disgusted the public with the
codes was the tendency (early exhibited) for an organized
majority of each industry to "racketeer" under the aegis of
"Code Authority" at the expense of less influential members
of the industry.
If that tendency is carried over into the "Little NRA"
initiated under the Guffey act, not only will there be no sta-
bilization but the condition created will be worse that the un-
restricted competition that now exists.
